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BY: RACHEL A. CARTIER
Padilla’s Collateral Attack Effect on  
Existing Federal Convictions
I. INTRODUCTION
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court stated “[i]t is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant–whether a citizen or not–is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”1 This is particu-
larly important today because, in 2008, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement “removed”2 97,1333 “known criminal 
aliens”4 from the United States.5 “Criminal aliens” are non-
citizens with deportable offenses 
such as: crimes of moral turpitude; 
multiple criminal convictions; ag-
gravated felonies; high speed flight; 
failure to register as a sex offender; 
certain drug offenses; certain fire-
arm offenses; espionage/sabotage/
treason; domestic violence; stalking; 
child abuse; violations of protec-
tive orders; crimes against children; 
trafficking; failure to register or fal-
sification of documents; and terror-
ist activities.6 As of June 2009, there 
were 94,498 aliens in state and fed-
eral custody, making up 4.1 percent 
of the total in-custody population.7 
Recent U.S. Census Bureau statis-
tics show over twenty-one million 
non-citizens residing in the United 
States, and it is unclear as to how many have deportable con-
victions on their records.8 As the Supreme Court has indicated, 
non-citizens are entitled to the same constitutional protections 
as citizens regarding legal representation.9
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district where in the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.10
The U.S. Supreme Court built upon the Sixth Amendment in 
Strickland v. Washington and held that counsel must meet the 
performance standard of “reasonably effective assistance.”11 In 
order to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the defendant has the burden of proof to 
show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below the “reason-
ably effective counsel” standard;12 
and (2) there is a “reasonable prob-
ability” that but for counsel’s un-
professional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been differ-
ent.13
On March 31, 2010, the U.S. 
Supreme Court once again expanded 
the reach of the Sixth Amendment 
and held in Padilla v. Kentucky that 
counsel has an obligation to advise 
their clients of possible immigra-
tion consequences upon entering 
guilty pleas.14 They further held that 
a failure to do so constitutes “inef-
fective counsel” and thus can render 
a plea agreement constitutionally 
invalid.15 The Supreme Court did 
not clarify whether Padilla would 
be applied retroactively to exist-
ing convictions, but the Court did state, “[it] now hold[s] that 
counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk 
of deportation,”16 and “[i]t seems unlikely that [their] decision 
today will have a significant effect on those convictions already 
obtained as a result of plea bargains.”17 The Supreme Court’s 
vagueness has resulted in a split in U.S. courts as they grapple 
with the language in Padilla, as well as existing case precedents 
to determine whether this is a “new rule” that should be applied 
retroactively.18
This uncertainty could have a profound impact because in 
2009, guilty pleas made up 96.3 percent of the convictions in 
U.S. district courts.19 Courts now have to balance the finality of 
convictions against defendants’ constitutional rights. This piece 
B$8B&/%LQGG $0
Criminal Law Brief 59
will analyze who can raise Padilla as a collateral attack to an 
existing federal conviction.20 It will first examine the opinion 
of Padilla, whether and to what extent Padilla should be ap-
plied retroactively to federal convictions, the procedural hurdles 
in place for collaterally challenging a federal conviction, and 
whether a defendant would want to raise this collateral attack. It 
will conclude by determining the likelihood of whether Padilla 
“will have a significant effect on those convictions already ob-
tained as the result of plea bargains.”21
II. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
Jose Padilla had lived lawfully in the United States for forty 
years as a permanent resident.22 Mr. Padilla was then charged 
in Kentucky with transportation of a large amount of marijuana 
and drug distribution.23 His counsel told him not to worry about 
deportation consequences because he had lived in the country 
for so long.24 Mr. Padilla then pled guilty to the drug distribu-
tion offense and subsequently faced deportation.25 Mr. Padilla 
claimed he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty 
had he known the charge put him at risk for deportation.26 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court denied Mr. Padilla’s post-conviction 
relief on the grounds that deportation is a “collateral” conse-
quence of a conviction, and as such, the Sixth Amendment does 
not protect defendants from erroneous advice regarding depor-
tation consequences.27
The U.S. Supreme Court started its analysis with an over-
view of immigration law and the changes that have increased the 
chances of deportation because of a criminal conviction.28 Now 
there is a broad class of deportable offenses and judges have 
limited authority to prevent deportation.29 The Court specifi-
cally pointed out that in 1996, Congress eliminated the Attorney 
General’s authority to grant discretionary relief to aliens facing 
deportation, thereby making deportation “practically inevitable” 
for those with deportable offenses.30 This high likelihood of de-
portation means it is more important now than ever for counsel 
to advise their clients regarding potential consequences.31 De-
portation is “sometimes the most important part of the penalty” 
imposed on non-citizens.32
Responding to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the U.S. Su-
preme Court pointed out that it does not distinguish between di-
rect and collateral consequences for the purpose of Strickland’s 
“reasonably effective counsel” requirement.33 The Court stated 
it was not important to make this distinction due to the inti-
mate relationship between deportation and the criminal process, 
which makes it uniquely difficult to classify the consequence as 
direct or collateral.34 Therefore, Strickland applies to situations 
where counsel must brief a client who is about to enter a plea 
with potential immigration consequences.35
In determining whether a counsel’s failure to a client of 
immigration consequences fell below Strickland’s “reasonably 
effective counsel” requirement, the Court recognized that the 
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that 
counsel must advise his or her client of potential immigration 
consequences, including the right to remain and the right not to 
be excluded from the United States.36 The Court held that af-
firmative wrong advice is as bad as no advice and that counsel 
must at least advise their client there may be adverse immigra-
tion consequences.37
In addition, the Supreme Court stated it considered the im-
portance of protecting the finality of guilty plea convictions.38 It 
recognized that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral 
challenges than convictions, accounting for only thirty percent 
of habeas petitions filed while nearly ninety-five percent of all 
criminal convictions result in the filing of habeas petitions.39 
The Court, therefore, did not feel that this ruling would open 
the floodgates to challenges of convictions obtained by plea 
bargains.40 It ultimately held that counsel must inform a client 
of whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, and Mr. Padilla 
proved that his counsel was constitutionally deficient because 
she did not inform him of potential immigration consequences.41 
As such, the case was remanded to the lower court to determine 
whether Mr. Padilla had been prejudiced and was thus entitled 
to have his conviction overturned.42
III. EFFECT ON COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON  
FEDERAL CONVICTIONS
The road through appeal is a long one.43 If a defendant 
wants to challenge a conviction, the defendant must file under 
the direct appeal process, exhausting all of the appropriate av-
enues.44 Once that is complete, a defendant may file a collateral 
challenge to their conviction.45 Collateral attacks are separate 
“quasi-civil” proceedings from the direct appeal, usually filed 
with the original trial court.46 Only constitutional claims or 
those resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice are “cogni-
zable” on collateral attack.47 Ineffective counsel implicates the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and would thus qualify as a 
constitutional claim.48
A. DOES PADILLA APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO 
 EXISTING CONVICTIONS?
Since 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court has presented “con-
fused and confusing” jurisprudence with regard to the ret-
roactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure.49 Padilla appears to be no different. Reasonable 
jurists are split with respect to whether Padilla should apply 
retroactively,50 with the lower courts divided.51 The language 
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Courts are split as to 
whether Padilla announced 
a “new rule” or just applied 
a well-established principle 
under Strickland.
of Padilla offers some insight into the Court’s opinion on the 
“floodgates” theory:
We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern . . . 
but nevertheless applied Strickland . . . [a] flood did 
not follow in that decision’s wake . . . [s]urmount-
ing Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task . . . [i]t 
seems unlikely that our decision today will have a sig-
nificant effect on those convictions already obtained as 
the result of plea bargains.52
These statements indicate that the Court considered the potential 
floodgates concerns and had determined that the constitutional 
right to receive effective counsel 
outweighed the need for finality. On 
the other hand, the Court states: “[l]
ikewise, although we must be espe-
cially careful about recognizing new 
grounds for attacking the validity of 
guilty pleas. . . .”53 Further, “we now 
hold that counsel must inform her 
client whether his plea carries a risk 
of deportation”54 because “our long-
standing Sixth Amendment prece-
dents, the seriousness of deportation 
as a consequence of a criminal plea, 
and the concomitant impact of de-
portation on families living lawfully 
in this country demand no less.”55 
This conclusion indicates that an at-
torney’s duty to inform a client of immigration consequences 
is a “new rule,” and only at this point have deportation conse-
quences become inevitable enough to warrant their inclusion 
during the plea bargaining process. These statements are power-
ful but unclear, leaving the courts little guidance in determining 
whether Padilla should be applied retroactively.56
1. What precedential case law does this U.S.  
 Supreme Court provide to determine whether  
 a rule of criminal procedure should be applied 
  retroactively?
In Teague v. Lane,57 the U.S. Supreme Court outlined the 
analysis to determine whether a rule applies retroactively, which 
is “unwavering in use today.”58 Teague holds old rules should 
be applied retroactively to cases on direct or collateral review;59 
however, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will 
not be applicable to those cases which have become final be-
fore the new rules are announced.”60 The question then becomes 
whether or not the case announced a “new rule.” The Court 
acknowledged:
It is admittedly difficult to determine when a case an-
nounces a new rule. . . . [H]owever, a case announces  
a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a 
new obligation on the States of the Federal Govern-
ment. . . . To put it differently, a case announces a new 
rule if the result was not dictated by precedent at the 
time the defendant’s conviction became final.61
Courts are split as to whether Padilla announced a “new rule” 
or just applied a well-established principle under Strickland.62
The Supreme Court provided an exception for “new rules” 
to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review “only if 
(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a ‘watershed rul[e] 
of criminal procedure’ implicat-
ing the fundamental fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal proceed-
ing.”63 A rule is substantive when 
“it alters the range of conduct or 
the class of persons the law pun-
ishes,”64 and it is procedural when 
it regulates the “manner of deter-
mining the defendant’s culpabil-
ity.”65 A rule is “watershed” only 
if it satisfies two requirements: (1) 
“[i]nfringement of the rule must 
‘seriously diminish the likelihood 
of obtaining an accurate convic-
tion,’”66 and (2) “the rule must 
‘alter our understanding of the 
‘bedrock procedural elements’ essential to the fairness of the 
proceeding.’”67
i. Does Padilla’s holding constitute a “new rule”?
In determining whether something is a “new rule,” the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Taylor that the courts must 
determine whether they applied a well-established constitu-
tional principle that has been considered precedent, and if not, 
it is a new rule.68 A rule will be considered a “new rule” if it 
imposes a new obligation on the states or federal government 
that falls outside the universe of federal law.69
In Butler v. McKellar, the Supreme Court applied its test 
of determining a “new rule” and held the bar to police-initiated 
interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel in a 
separate investigation, set forth in Arizona v. Roberson,70 was 
a “new rule.”71 Even though the Court in Roberson stated it 
was directly controlled by Edwards v. Arizona, which bars po-
lice initiated interrogation after the defendant invokes his Fifth 
Amendment right,72 the Butler decision “is not conclusive for 
purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a new rule 
under Teague.”73 The Court further acknowledged that there was 
a “significant difference of opinion on the part of several lower 
courts that had considered the question previously.”74 This in-
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dicated that there was “debate among reasonable minds”75 and 
that “it would not have been illogical or drudging application of 
Edwards to decide it did not extend to the facts of Roberson.”76 
Due to the fact that there was not strong precedent, the Court 
held that the Roberson rule applying a defendant’s single invo-
cation of his Fifth Amendment right to all matters77 was a “new 
rule” and thus did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral 
attack.78
Since 2002, six of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
all clearly held that potential immigration consequences were 
collateral consequences of a plea, and therefore, counsel had 
no constitutional obligation to advise a non-citizen client of the 
possible immigration consequences prior to the client entering 
a plea.79 In United States v. Fry, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated that as of 2003, all other circuits to address the 
question of “whether or not counsel performs deficiently by 
failing to advise a defendant of immigrations consequences” 
have found that deportation is a collateral consequence; thus, 
counsel has no duty to advise a client of immigration conse-
quences.80 The debate as to whether immigration consequences 
fell under the requirements of due process or the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure occurred even though the Court found 
it is the “weight of the prevailing norms” that requires counsel 
to advise their client of potential immigration consequences.81 
Like Butler, it seems that “reasonable minds” could disagree, 
and therefore this should constitute a “new rule.”82
In addition, as articulated in Williams,83 this holding does 
impose a new responsibility on the federal government because 
federal defenders will be now required to advise their clients 
of potential immigration consequences upon entering a guilty 
plea.84 This same obligation could also be forced upon federal 
court judges.85 Therefore, Padilla constitutes a “new rule” and 
would not be applicable to cases on collateral review unless it 
fell into the “watershed rule” exception.86
ii. If it constitutes a “new rule,” does it fall into the Teague 
“watershed rule” exception?
In fourteen separate cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
been asked to determine whether or not a rule is “watershed,” 
and fourteen times the Court has not applied the exception.87 
In Teague, the Supreme Court stated that the Gideon v. Wain-
wright right to counsel for indigent defendants for a serious 
crime88 would constitute a watershed rule.89 The Supreme Court 
stated, “[w]e have repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of 
the second Teague exception, explaining that ‘it is clearly meant 
to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of 
those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’”90 Furthermore, “any qualifying rule ‘would be so cen-
tral to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt [that it is] 
unlikely that many such components of basic due process have 
yet to emerge,’”91 thus “it should come as no surprise that we 
have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague 
exception.”92 Although Padilla involves the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel, it is unlikely to constitute a “water-
shed rule” because the Supreme Court has yet to find one and 
has issued strongly worded opinions against them.93
iii. Assuming Padilla is an old rule or a “new rule” that 
fits into an exception under Teague, how far back should 
Padilla apply retroactively?
The Supreme Court stated in 1996 that deportation became 
“practically inevitable”94 for those with a deportable criminal 
conviction because that was when “Congress . . . eliminated 
the Attorney General’s authority to grant discretionary relief 
from deportation.”95 Therefore, it could be presumed that prior 
to 1996, deportation was not “practically inevitable”96 for aliens 
convicted with deportable offenses. It would also follow that 
only after deportation became “practically inevitable”97 would 
attorneys have a duty to advise their clients of potential im-
migration consequences. Therefore, a reasonable conclusion 
would be that only defendants with convictions post-1996 
would be able to use Padilla to collaterally attack those convic-
tions, greatly reducing the number of federal convictions that 
could be collaterally attacked.
B. DOES A CONVICTION FAIL THE TWO-PRONG TEST 
 SET FORTH IN STRICKLAND?
The first prong of the Strickland test requires the court to 
find that the petitioner was not advised of immigration conse-
quences; however, the Court stated that the duty to inform has 
been a part of the professional responsibility of counsel for at 
least the past fifteen years, according to professional norms.98 
Therefore counsel benefits from a presumption that it has satis-
fied this obligation when advising their clients of plea conse-
quences.99 This responsibility puts the burden on the defendant 
to prove that he was not advised of potential immigration con-
sequences. This burden could be very difficult since not all con-
versations between an attorney and her client are on the record, 
and most attorneys are probably unwilling to sign declarations 
stating that they did not warn their clients of potential immigra-
tion consequences.
The second prong compels a petitioner to “convince the 
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 
rational under the circumstances.”100 This requirement allows 
courts to evaluate the original plea agreement to determine 
whether the defendant could have received a better offer or in 
light of the evidence and very real deportation possibilities, de-
cided to go to trial instead. The Court recognized that this could 
take a significant amount of analysis from the lower courts, 
acknowledged that these courts were “now quite experienced 
with applying Strickland,”101 and decided to “effectively and 
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efficiently use its framework to separate specious claims form 
those with substantial merit.”102
C. DOES A CONVICTION MEET THE PROCEDURAL  
 REQUIREMENTS?
After a defendant has completed the direct appeal process, 
the defendant can file a collateral challenge to his or her con-
viction.103 In order to proceed on the collateral challenge, the 
defendant has to meet any procedural requirements set forth in 
the applicable statute or case law.104 The most common type of 
federal post-conviction remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, and 
there is a “related but distinct” rarely used writ of coram nobis 
as well.105
1. Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. 2254, a defendant can file an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court on the ground 
that he or she is in custody in violation of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.106 The term “in custody” has been liberally construed to 
require only that the defendant is still completing a part of their 
sentence, which can include probation.107
28 U.S.C. 2255 does provide for a one-year statute of limi-
tations from:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction be-
comes final; (2) the date on which the impediment 
to making a motion created by governmental action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States is removed, if the movant was prevented from 
making a motion by such governmental action; (3) 
the date on which the right asserted was initially rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been 
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made ret-
roactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or 
claims presented could have been discovered through 
the exercise of due diligence.108
If Padilla sets forth a “new rule,” then defendants have until 
March 31, 2011, one year after the decision, to challenge their 
convictions. If it is an old rule, then defendants have one year 
from the date of their original conviction.
A writ for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the 
applicant has exhausted all of his remedies in the state court, 
there is an absence of available process, or circumstances are 
such that they render the process ineffective.109 The defendant 
has to make sure that he has exhausted all of these remedies. 
The applicant has to prove that the lower court’s decision 
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States”110 or that his claim relies on “a new 
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collat-
eral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail- 
able . . . .”111 The defendant would be able to demonstrate his 
claim by proving his or her case was out of compliance with 
Padilla and Strickland, and thus he or she suffered an unreason-
able application of clearly established federal law.
2. Writ of Coram Nobis
The writ of coram nobis112 is “an extraordinary remedy” 
that allows a petitioner to attack an unconstitutional conviction 
after the petitioner has served his or her sentence and is no lon-
ger in custody.113 There is no statute of limitations for the writ of 
coram nobis.114 The writ should be granted “only under circum-
stances compelling such action to achieve justice.”115 The Ninth 
Circuit requires a petitioner to prove the following to qualify for 
coram nobis relief:
(1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons 
exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse conse-
quences exist from the conviction to satisfy the case and con-
troversy requirement of Article III; and (4) the error suffered is 
of the most fundamental character.116
A writ of coram nobis is filed after a defendant has served 
his sentence117 when a more usual remedy is unavailable. The 
petitioner is responsible for establishing that valid reasons ex-
isted for not attacking the conviction earlier and that he sus-
tained sufficiently adverse consequences to satisfy Article III’s 
case and controversy requirement. This threshold question 
could require that the petitioner show that actual deportation 
proceedings are underway to meet this requirement. Petitioner 
would be able to rely on Padilla and Strickland to prove that the 
error he suffered is of the most fundamental character.
D. DOES THE PARTY REALLY WANT TO OVERTURN  
 THEIR CONVICTION?
The Supreme Court in Padilla recognized those “who col-
laterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain 
obtained as a result of the plea”118 and “the challenge may result 
in a less favorable outcome for the defendant.”119 Defendants 
voluntarily agree to enter plea agreements, and a petitioner who 
collaterally challenges his agreement and has it set aside could 
easily be forced to go to trial to face much stiffer penalties. 
Although the Court in Padilla stated “informed consideration 
of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and non-
citizen defendants during the plea-bargaining process,”120 it ap-
pears that the government could have the upper hand, which 
could leave defendants to the mercy of the prosecutor.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If courts decide to apply Padilla retroactively, it will only 
affect a small number of convictions. Padilla requires the con-
viction be (1) post-1996; (2) of a non-citizen; (3) convicted of 
a deportable offense; (4) who can prove that he or she was not 
advised of potential immigration consequences; (5) who is now 
facing immigration/adverse consequences such that he or she 
has standing; (6) that he can meet the procedural requirements 
for their choice of remedy (habeas corpus or writ of coram 
nobis); and (7) he is willing to give up the benefit of his or her 
plea agreement in an attempt to get a better deal. Unless previ-
ous witnesses or evidence is unavailable, there is nothing to 
suggest that prosecutors will be willing to bargain for pleas that 
avoid immigration consequences, especially since there is no 
easy way out with so many deportable convictions.121 Therefore, 
trial is the most likely option for any plea deemed constitution-
ally invalid, and chances of success are uncertain at best.
Whether Padilla applies retroactively or not, the Supreme 
Court was correct in stating “[i]t seems unlikely that our deci-
sion today will have a significant effect on those convictions 
already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”122 It does not 
appear as though the “floodgates”123 will open, filling the courts 
with writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis. At the same time, 
the Supreme Court achieved its goal in protecting non-citizens 
from the “‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”124 At the very 
least, it established a solid precedent across the United States re-
garding the advisement of potential immigration consequences, 
if not a “new rule” all together. CLB
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